The studies were classified according to study population, study design and whether they attempted to correct for major study design biases.Įstimates were extracted from fifty-nine published and unpublished studies.įifty-nine studies were found, yielding 123 estimates of the impact of SNAP benefits on food expenditures and 117 estimates of the difference in impacts between SNAP benefits and other income. An electronic search of EconPapers, AgEcon Search, EconLit, WorldCat, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, PubMed and NALDC, and a snowball search were conducted to obtain a sample of studies up to March 2015 that estimate the impacts of SNAP and other income on household food expenditures. The impact on food expenditures of a $US 1 reduction in available SNAP benefits can be used to estimate the impact of restrictions on SNAP-eligible foods. not allowing purchase of sugar-sweetened beverages with SNAP benefits) on expenditures for restricted foods. To systematically review the potential impact of reducing the set of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)-eligible foods (e.g. I present new survey evidence indicating that stamps trade for only about 65 percent of their face value on the underground market. Although paying in-kind benefits results in some deadweight loss, it is thought that an underground market for the excess stamps will be created to alleviate some of the loss. As predicted by theory, inframarginal food stamp recipients do not alter their behavior if they are given cash instead of food stamps.
Food diary data indicate that providing cash instead of stamps causes some distorted recipients to decrease their food spending - especially on soda and juice - but has no negative consequence for nutrition. Aggregating over recipients, the annual deadweight loss associated with the food stamp program is one-half billion dollars. Using a theoretical model I present and data from experiments conducted in two states, I estimate that on average "distorted" food stamp recipients value their total benefits at 80 percent of their face value. I estimate that between 20 and 30 percent of food stamp recipients spend less on food than their food stamp benefit amount if they receive cash instead of stamps, and therefore would be better off with cash. I estimate the cash-equivalent value of food stamps and the lowest price a recipient would accept to sell her "extra" food stamps on the underground market. The carte-blanche principle implies that food stamp recipients would be better off if they were given cash instead of an equivalent amount in food stamps.
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